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Abstract 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is commonly used when 
conducting risk assessments of industrial systems. A 
number of computer packages based on conventional 
analysis methods are available to perform the analysis. 
However, dealing with large (possibly non-coherent) fault 
trees can expose the limitations of the technique in terms 
of accuracy of the solutions and the processing time 
required. Over recent years the Binary Decision Diagram 
(BDD) method has been developed for the solution of the 
fault tree and overcomes the disadvantages of the 
conventional FTA approaches. The usual way of taking 
advantage of the BDD structure is to construct a fault 
tree and then convert it to a BDD. This paper will focus 
on the fault tree to BDD conversion process.  
Converting the fault tree requires the basic events of 
the fault tree to be placed in an ordering. This is critical 
to the size of the final BDD and ultimately affects the 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the system and 
benefits of this method. Once the ordering is established 
several approaches can be used for the BDD generation. 
One approach is to apply a set of rules developed by 
Rauzy which are repeatedly applied to each gate in the 
fault tree to generate the BDD. An alternative approach 
can be used when BDD constructs for each of the gate 
types are first built and then connected together. A sub-
node sharing feature in the second of these approaches 
and a third, hybrid, combined approach will be presented. 
Some remarks on the effectiveness of these techniques will 
be provided. 
1. Introduction 
The Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) method [1] has 
been developed as an approach for the analysis of fault 
trees. This method has been shown to have advantages in 
terms of both efficiency and accuracy over the 
conventional Kinetic Tree Theory [2], since top event 
probabilities can be derived without the need for 
approximation and also without the need to evaluate the 
minimal cut sets as intermediate results. 
The BDD method first converts the fault tree to a 
binary decision diagram, which represents the Boolean 
equation for the top event. Problems may occur with the 
conversion process of the fault tree to the BDD. If the 
ordering of the basic events is not chosen suitably, the 
size of the final BDD can grow exponentially. It is 
impossible to identify an optimum ordering scheme for 
producing BDDs for all fault trees. In this paper 
alternative conversion methods are presented. These 
include new methods where BDDs for each of the gate 
types are formed and then joined together according to the 
type of the parent gate in the fault tree. 
The efficiency of the alternative approaches is 
compared with the conventional method developed by 
Rauzy [1]. Three efficiency measures are applied while 
looking for the optimum connection technique. A sub-
node sharing approach is introduced to the component 
connection method during the connection process, 
together with the development of the hybrid approach 
utilising the advantageous rules of both approaches. 
2. Binary decision diagram method 
A BDD is a directed acyclic graph, as shown in Figure 
1. All paths through the BDD start at the root vertex and 
terminate in one of two states – a 1-state (system failure), 
or a 0-state (system success). The BDD is composed of 
terminal and non-terminal vertices, which are connected 
by branches. Terminal vertices correspond to the final 
state of the system and non-terminal vertices correspond 
to the basic events of the fault tree. By connection, all left 
branches leaving a vertex are the 1-branches (component 
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fails), all right branches are the 0-braches (component 
functions).  
Figure 1. Example of BDD?
The BDD encodes the logic function of the system 
failure in its disjoint form. In the example of a fault tree 
and its equivalent BDD shown in Figure 2 the logic 
function is:  
Top =x1·(x2 + x3)·(x2 + x4) = x1·x2 + x1·x3·x4 [1] 
where “+” represents Boolean operator OR, “·” represents 
Boolean operator AND. 
Figure 2. Example FT converted to BDD, 
ordering x1 < x2 < x3 < x4?
In the BDD shown in Figure 2 there are two possible 
paths that terminate in a 1 state:  
2,1 xx ?and? 4,3,2,1 xxxx ? [2]
Each path describes a combination of component 
conditions where the existence of all of them will result in 
system failure. These two paths, when considering only 
the failure events, give the two cut sets: 
{x1,x2} and { x1,x3, x4}. [3] 
Only the vertices that lie on the 1 branches of the paths 
are included in the cut sets. The cut sets obtained are 
minimal (they contain necessary and sufficient elements), 
since the BDD in this example is in its minimal form. 
Otherwise, the BDD has to undergo a minimisation 
procedure, introduced in [1], in order to obtain minimal 
cut sets.  
The probability of occurrence of the top event, SYSQ ,
can be expressed as the sum of the probabilities of the 
disjoint paths through the BDD, since paths through the 
BDD are mutually exclusive. The probability of system 
failure in the example is: 
( ) 432121 1 xxxxxxSYS qqqqqqQ −+= ? [4]
A number of other probabilistic properties of the 
system can also be calculated [3]. 
3. Conventional conversion approach – 
Rauzy (approach 1) 
A commonly used method of constructing BDDs was 
developed by Rauzy [1]. This approach applies an if-then-
else (ite) technique to each of the gates in the fault tree. If 
f(x) is the Boolean function for the top event then the 
given ite structure ( )21,,ite ffX  means that if variable X
occurs (fails) then consider 1f , else consider 2f , where 
1f  and 2f are Boolean functions, known as the residues 
of f , with 1=X  and 0=X  respectively. Therefore, in 
the BDD structure 1f  lies below the 1-branch of the node 
encoding  X and 2f  lies below the 0-branch.  
First of all, a variable ordering for basic events needs 
to be established. Then the conversion of every gate to the 
BDD is performed according to the following rules: 
Let J and H be two nodes in the BDD where 
( )21,,ite ffXJ =  and ( )21,,ite ggYG = .
• If X appears before Y in the variable ordering  
( YX < ) then 
J<op>G=ite(X, f1<op> G, f2<op> G) [5] 
• if YX = then 
J<op>G=ite(X, f1<op> g1, f2<op> g2) [6] 
where <op> corresponds to the type of the gate (Boolean 
operator) of the gates in the fault tree. 
Figure 3. Example FT converted to BDD, using 
the ite technique 
Consider the example in Figure 3. The ordering x1 < 
x2 < x3 < x4 < x5 represents a simple top-down left-right 
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traversal of the fault tree. The application of the rules give 
the expressions for gates G1, G2 and Top:  
G1 = x2 + x3 + x4
= ite(x2,1,0) + ite(x3,1,0) + ite(x4,1,0)
= ite(x2,1,ite(x3,1,0)) + ite(x4,1,0)
= ite(x2,1,ite(x3,1,ite(x4,1,0))) 
G2 = x2 + x5
= ite(x2,1,0) + ite(x5,1,0) 
= ite(x2,1,ite(x5,1,0)) 
Top = x1·G1·G2 
= ite(x1,1,0)· 
ite(x2,1,ite(x3,1,ite(x4,1,0)))·G2  
= ite(x1,ite(x2,1,ite(x3,1,ite(x4,1,0))),0)· 
ite(x2,1,ite(x5,1,0)) 
= ite(x1,ite(x2,1,ite(x3,f1,ite(x4,f1,0))),0) 
where 
f1= ite(x5,1,0) 
 The resulting BDD is shown in Figure 3 and is an 
ordered BDD, where traversing the BDD along any path 
from the root vertex will encounter the nodes in the order 
specified. For example, the variables in the path 2,1 xx
appear according to the established ordering. Using this 
approach the variable ordering is retained  throughout the  
BDD because every step of the connection is performed 
according to the ordering of the elements. 
The method automatically uses sub-node sharing 
storing each ite structure in the memory only once and 
reusing calculated ite structures further in the process.  
4. Component connection methods 
4.1. Basic approach (approach 2) 
The basic method of the second approach, the 
component connection method, is presented in [4]. The 
method starts by considering those gates which have only 
basic events as inputs. These gates are expressed as a 
BDD structure, which is known to represent “AND” or 
“OR” gate types. It then ascends the fault tree structure 
considering any gate whose inputs are already expressed 
as BDDs. It builds a BDD for an “AND” gate or an “OR” 
gate utilising simple rules of connection. Initially BDDs 
for fault trees are constructed without considering the 
repetition along the BDD paths of basic events in the fault 
tree. The resulting BDD then undergoes a simplification 
procedure. The connection and simplification rules with 
some alternative strategies are presented in this section. 
The ordering of basic events is not necessary for this 
approach, since the connection process can be applied 
without following any fixed ordering scheme for the 
whole system. However, a selection scheme has to be 
specified which will define the way in which gate inputs, 
either basic events or BDDs, are selected for the 
connection process.
The connection rules are: 
1. If a gate is an “AND” gate, the BDD nodes 
representing its inputs are connected to each other 
through the 1-branches of the nodes. If a gate is an 
“OR” gate, the BDD nodes are connected through the 
0-branches (see Figure 4(i) and (ii)).
2. While merging two BDDs, representing two inputs of 
a parent gate, one of them is set to be the main BDD, 
according to the rule of selection. Then, if two BDDs 
are inputs to an “AND” gate, the secondary BDD is 
connected to every terminal 1-node of the main BDD 
or if two BDDs are inputs to an “OR” gate, the 
secondary BDD is connected to every terminal 0-node 
of the main BDD (see Figure 4(iii) and (iv)). 
Figure 4. Example of connection rules  
BDDs constructed in this way can feature more than 
one node representing the same variable on its paths. In 
order to avoid contradictory states of the repeated events 
in the BDD each path featuring a repeated variable can be
simplified using the following rule: 
The first occurrence of the event in the path specifies 
the state of the repeated variable. The node, that 
represents the second occurrence of the event, then needs 
to be replaced by the events below it on either its 1 or 0 
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branch, depending on the component state specified by its 
first occurrence in the path. For example, if the path 
passes through the 1-branch of a node, the second 
appearance of that event should be replaced by the BDD 
structure below the 1-branch of this second node. If the 
path passes through the first variable occurrence on its 0-
branch, the second occurrence of the variable is replaced 
by the BDD structure on its 0-branch. 
A second rule to simplify the BDD can also be applied: 
If the BDD structures below the 1 and 0 branches of 
any node are the same, this node is irrelevant and needs to 
be replaced by the structure below either one of the 
branches. In other words, if the state of the system does 
not depend on the occurrence of the basic event, the 
insignificant node must be removed.  
To demonstrate this approach it has been applied to the 
fault tree illustrated in Figure 3 resulting in the BDD in 
Figure 5. In this example the fault tree is traversed in the 
bottom-up manner. When constructing any gate BDD the 
variables are considered in a left-right variable ordering 
for every gate in a fault tree. The left-most BDD input for 
any gate is set to be the main BDD to which the others are 
joined.  
The connection process starts constructing two BDDs 
for gates G1 and G2, shown in Figure 5(i) and Figure 5(ii) 
respectively. Since gates G1 and G2 are “OR” gates, the 
resulting BDDs are “OR” chains.  
Then the top event, which is an “AND” gate is 
considered. The left-most BDD, basic event x1, is 
selected as the main BDD. Then the two BDDs from 
Figure 5(i) and 5(ii) are connected one by one to the 1 
branch of the main BDD. The first connection results in 
the BDD in Figure 5(iii). The BDD after the last 
connection is presented in Figure 5(iv), where all left 
branches are 1 branches and right branches are 0 
branches. 
Finally, the simplification rules are applied. There is 
only one repeated event, x2, and its repetitions need to be 
removed from three current paths. In the first path F1-F2-
F3-F4 node F3 is replaced by the terminal 1-node, since 
this path traverses the 1-branch of node F2, the first 
occurrence of the repeated event. In the second path F1-
F2-F5-F6-F7 the repeated event x2 is removed, replacing 
node F6 by node F7. In the same way node F9 is replaced 
by node F10 in the third path F1-F2-F5-F8-F9-F10. The 
final BDD is shown in Figure 5(v). 
In this example the basic events were connected 
according to the order that they appear in the list of gate 
inputs. However, it is possible to apply a defined ordering 
scheme for the nodes which will be used during the 
construction method. There is a number of structural or 
weighted ordering schemes [5], that can be applied. The 
chosen ordering schemes can affect the efficiency of the 
conversion process.  
BDDs were selected according to the order that gate 
inputs are listed, i.e. the BDD, presenting the left-most 
gate, is set to be the main BDD. Other selection schemes 
can be used which can result in a smaller BDD and/or in a 
shorter processing time. BDDs can be ordered according 
to the position of their root vertex in an ordering scheme 
defined for the basic events or according to the smallest 
number of available branches where connections will be 
made. The efficiency of different strategies can be 
analysed comparing the number of nodes in the final 
BDD and the processing time. 
Figure 5. Example FT converted to BDD, using 
the component connection method?
The component connection process does not require 
the variable ordering applying the described connection 
rules. Therefore, even if the variable ordering is set from 
the start, i.e. for the conversion of gates including basic 
event inputs only, it is not retained when merging two 
BDDs. The resulting BDD of the component connection 
method is not an ordered BDD as achieved using the 
conventional approach. It does however retain the disjoint 
path property. 
The basic component connection method does not use 
the sub-node sharing and it can lead to inefficient memory 
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usage. For example, in Figure 5(v) there are two identical 
nodes F7 and F10, which could be shared in the BDD 
obtained using the ite technique (Figure 3). Therefore, an 
extension to the component connection method is made 
by introducing a form of sub-node sharing.
4.2. Sub-node sharing (approach 3) 
Sub-node sharing adds a significant contribution to the 
efficiency of the conventional BDD construction 
approach. It can be also implemented in the component 
connection method during the connection of two BDDs, 
for example, merging two inputs for an “AND” gate, as it 
is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Figure 6. Sub-node sharing
In this example the left BDD is set to be the main 
BDD. It has two available connection points, i.e. two 
terminal 1-vertices, that can share the same copy of the 
second BDD. This connection is always suitable if the 
BDDs contain no repeated events in the fault tree.  
The conversion method starts by applying the first 
connection rule, presented in the previous section, 
considering those gates which have only basic events as 
inputs. Then the process continues ascending the fault tree 
structure. The second rule is applied while merging the 
BDDs representing gate inputs. Applying the sub-node 
sharing the secondary BDD can be connected to all 
terminal nodes if while descending the BDD from the root 
vertex the same branches (1-branches or 0-branches) of 
repeated events were traversed. Otherwise, a new copy of 
the secondary BDD needs to be used. 
The sub-node sharing rule is:  
If paths to two terminal vertices (two terminal 1-nodes 
for BDDs being inputs to an AND gate and two terminal 
0-nodes for BDDs being inputs to an OR gate) traverse 
the same branches of repeated events, the same copy of 
the second BDD can be connected to both of the two 
terminal nodes. 
In the example from Figure 5, the BDD in 5(iii) is set 
to be the main BDD during the last connection of the two 
BDDs (Figure 5(ii), Figure 5(iii)). Since the BDDs 
represent two gate inputs to an AND gate the paths from 
the root vertex to the three terminal 1-nodes of the main 
BDD are investigated. There is only one repeated event 
x2 in the fault tree. The first path passes the 1-branch of 
node x2, the second and the third paths pass the 0-branch 
of node x2. Since the second and the third paths pass the 
same branch of the repeated node the second and the third 
terminal nodes can be replaced by the same copy of the 
secondary BDD. The final BDD is shown in Figure 7(i) 
and 7(ii), after the connection and after the simplification 
processes respectively.   
Figure 7. Application of sub-node sharing to the 
component connection method
The resulting BDD in Figure 7(ii) matches the one 
obtained using the ite technique, Figure 3.  
Note. Applying the sub-node sharing all repeated 
events in the system must to be considered, not only those 
between the two BDDs under the current connection.   
4.3. Hybrid approach (approach 4) 
This approach is introduced to utilise the efficient parts 
of each algorithm presented. It is clear, that: 
i) using the gate constructs for basic events and 
branches without repeated events BDDs can be 
immediately formulated without any of processing 
required by the ite method.
ii) the sub-node sharing feature of the ite method 
provides a more efficient representation of the 
logic function. 
Therefore, a new algorithm has been created based on 
the effective features of each approach to obtain the best 
efficiency.  
As was described before, using the component 
connection method does not require the variable ordering.  
However, since this new approach also uses the ite 
method a variable ordering needs to be introduced to the 
component connection method. This then produces 
ordered BDDs, which are used for the ite technique. 
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First of all, a variable ordering needs to be established 
which will be used when applying the rules of both 
methods. Then the building of BDDs for gates containing 
event inputs only starts, where events are put in a chain 
according to the type of the gate (component connection 
approach). This construction process can be applied 
regardless of the number of events into a gate without 
breaking them down into pairs, since the rules in the ite
technique deal only with two ite structures at once.  The 
variable ordering needs to be retained while putting basic 
events in a chain. The comparison of the component 
connection method and its application in the hybrid 
method is shown in Figure 8. 
Figure 8. Comparison between the two 
methods while converting a gate with event 
inputs only 
For more complex parts, that do not contain any 
repeated events, the straightforward connection can be 
also applied. However, the variable ordering needs to be 
taken into the consideration, i.e. the merging of the two 
BDDs can be applied only if all the events of the main 
BDD are before the events of the secondary BDD in the 
variable ordering. This situation is shown in Figure 9. 
While building the BDD for gates with repeated 
events, the ite technique rules are applied.  
For example in Figure 3, BDDs for gates G1 and G2
are created placing its basic events in “OR” chains as it 
was shown in Figure 5(i) and (ii). Then the BDDs are 
merged applying the ite rules, given in equations 5 and 6. 
Figure 9. Hybrid approach for the parts 
without repeated events 
5. Comparison of the methods 
The performance of the conversion methods will 
depend on the structure of the fault tree. An indication of 
any advantages can only be measured over a large range 
of problems. The four approaches discussed in this paper 
were investigated using a library of 12 fault trees. Their 
characteristics are shown in Table 1.  
Table 1. Characteristics of example fault trees 
Test 
FT 
Number 
of Gates
Number 
of Basic 
Events  
Number 
of 
Repeated
Events 
Number 
of 
Minimal 
Cut Sets 
1 48 94 33 6391 
2 51 53 2 764 
3 52 47 8 122 
4 46 64 12 423 
5 48 114 64 66083 
6 45 100 52 3344 
7 46 84 25 1633 
8 49 98 44 8113 
9 48 72 14 493 
10 38 58 15 898 
11 54 110 56 200063
12 37 77 38 45505 
The first column identifies the example fault tree, then 
the next three columns present indications of the 
complexity of the fault tree in terms of the number of 
gates, the number of basic events and the number of 
repeated events. The last column presents the number of 
minimal cut sets. Trying to achieve a consistent 
comparison of the four methods the variable ordering for 
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basic events was chosen not only for the conventional 
method but also for the component connection method, 
even though it is not needed. The modified top-down left-
right approach for the ordering of basic events was 
applied [5].   
The measurements, that were chosen for the 
comparison of the four methods are: the number of nodes 
in the final BDD, the maximum number of lines in the 
storage array (representing the number of intermediate 
calculations performed), and the processing time. The 
results obtained by applying the four methods to the fault 
trees in the library are shown in Table 2, Table 3 and 
Table 4 respectively. 
Table 2. Final BDD size of the four 
construction methods
Number of nodes in final BDD 
Test 
FT Ite 
Method 
Component 
Connection 
Method 
Component 
Connection 
Method 
with 
Sharing 
Hybrid 
Method
1 12470 189823 99046 12470
2 860 3153 2105 860 
3 368 1114 899 368 
4 1472 3876 2614 1472 
5 18460 207800 81068 18460
6 16797 529729 20027 16797
7 1726 11306 5659 1726 
8 1945 6980 2762 1945 
9 1618 4085 2311 1618 
10 1701 13324 11751 1701 
11 8026 89466 13040 8026 
12 1006 11729 2169 1006 
Table 3. Number of intermediate calculations 
in the storage array of the four construction 
methods 
Number of lines in storage array 
Test 
FT Ite 
Method 
Component 
Connection 
Method 
Component 
Connection 
Method 
with 
Sharing 
Hybrid 
Method
1 12684 2084163 111880 12668
2 1138 59326 2129 1121 
3 579 17752 1051 560 
4 1773 359319 2614 1749 
5 18639 452066 81933 18629
6 17149 1575967 20827 17134
7 1932 336782 6556 1916 
8 2138 257947 2870 2130 
9 1951 277230 2315 1930 
10 1950 80371 11779 1931 
11 8194 414932 13312 8191 
12 1138 71507 2179 1129 
Table 4. Processing time of the four 
construction methods 
Conversion time, s 
Test 
FT Ite
Method
Component 
Connection 
Method 
Component 
Connection 
Method 
with 
Sharing 
Hybrid 
Method
1 2.265 4.125 4.859 2.14 
2 0.047 0.14 0.375 0.031
3 0.016 0.031 0.281 0.016
4 0.062 0.344 1.063 0.063
5 5.953 1.031 1.953 5.656
6 5.156 2.235 1.093 4.375
7 0.078 0.328 1.594 0.062
8 0.219 0.469 4.812 0.063
9 0.078 0.328 1.766 0.046
10 0.078 0.265 0.562 0.063
11 1.234 0.641 0.016 0.984
12 0.063 0.11 0.766 0.062
The first construction method (ite  method) resulted 
in smaller BDDs and smaller number of lines in the 
storage array for all the example fault trees than the 
component connection method. The processing time was 
also shorter for almost all example fault trees, except 
three cases, (5), (6) and (11). Results for the basic 
approach of the component connection method were 
presented in [6]. 
Using the component connection approach with the 
sub-node sharing all the BDDs generated were smaller 
than using the basic component connection method, but 
the processing time increased, except examples (6) and 
(9), due to an extra time taken to identify parts in the 
BDD suitable for the sub-node sharing. 
The hybrid method resulted in BDDs with the same 
number of nodes than the conventional approach. 
However, it gave slightly better results in terms of the two 
other measurements, the number of lines in the storage 
array and the computational time. This was due to the 
capability to obtain the BDDs for gates with event inputs 
only in a more efficient way, i.e. inputs of a gate were 
placed in a chain straightforwardly without the need to do 
it one by one. Also, more complex parts of the fault tree 
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without repeated events were converted to the BDD using 
the rules of the component connection method. In 
summary, using the hybrid method resulted in the same 
size of the final BDD as applying the conventional 
approach, but a better efficiency was achieved, since the 
computational time was shorter and the maximum number 
of lines in the storage array was smaller. Therefore, the 
hybrid method can be used as an efficient alternative 
technique for converting fault trees to BDDs.  
6.Conclusions 
This paper presents four approaches for the conversion 
of fault trees to BDDs. The first method is Rauzy’s ite 
method, the second is the basic component connection 
method. The third approach is an advanced form of the 
component connection method. A hybrid method which 
utilises the more efficient features of two basic methods is 
also presented. Test fault trees have been used and the 
results for the four methods compared. Conversion time, 
number of nodes in the final BDD and number of lines in 
the storage array were used as efficiency measures while 
working on all the methods. It is shown that as a general 
fault tree to BDD conversion technique the method 
proposed by Rauzy performs well. The component 
connection method does not compete with Rauzy’s 
method very well even if the sub-node is incorporated. 
However, the hybrid method, as a mixture of two  
approaches, can provide a good alternative technique for 
conversion of fault trees to BDDs.  
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